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ARTICLE 
AMERICA'S AMBIGUOUS EXCEPTIONALISM 
MARK B. ROTENBERG* 
America's preeminent role in the world today is on everyone's mind. 
One cannot pick up a newspaper or watch TV without hearing of interna-
tional crises that are supposed to have been triggered, or that must be re-
solved, by the United States. The United States is a hegemonic military 
power; it is the only nation that can credibly project its will by force any-
where on Earth. Its economy is a world powerhouse, notwithstanding it 
comprises only five percent of the world's population. The economic output 
of the ten largest American metropolitan areas alone exceeds every nation 
on earth except Japan (and the United States itself). American ingenuity 
fuels an astonishing degree of technological innovation; over half of all 
patents issued worldwide go to American inventors. American businesses 
comprise four-fifths of the top fifteen most respected companies in the 
world.' In culture, fashion and higher education, America's impact seems 
vastly outsized as well, engendering pervasive acceptance, imitation, jeal-
ousy, and resistance. 
Awareness of these phenomena has led to a resurgence of the idea that 
America is an exceptional nation. The theme of American exceptionalism 
has been with us since colonial times.2 But for the past several decades the 
notion that the United States was exceptional had lost considerable cur-
rency, particularly in academic circles. The Bush administration's response 
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1. Philip Coggan, New Economy Takes the Spotlight, Fin. Times (London) 1 (Nov. 18, 
2005) (noting the dominance of American companies in the Times' list of the world's most 
respected companies; 24 of 50 are American); Richard Florida, The World Is Spiky, 296 The 
Atlantic 48 (Oct. 2005) (discussing patents). 
2. Infra nn. 8-13 and accompanying text. 
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to the attacks of 9/11, however, has revived exceptionalism as a leading 
theme for American politicians, social commentators, and international crit-
ics alike. As Oxford historian Godfrey Hodgson recently wrote, "American 
exceptionalism did not end. It has returned, and with a vengeance."3 
Claims about American exceptionalism abound in discussions about 
the character of United States politics, government, international relations, 
economy, religion, education, and culture. Discovering what makes the 
United States special, exemplary, or unique has been a historic preoccupa-
tion of countless American social scientists and foreign observers.4 The ac-
ademic field of American Studies in many ways was rooted in-and still 
focuses on-the basic question of American distinctiveness.5 The breadth 
and ubiquity of such inquiries suggest not only great interest in the topic, 
but also the potential for considerable confusion. 
This article will survey a number of diverse meanings of American 
exceptionalism, and evaluate some of the principal critiques that have been 
offered, questioning both the concept's descriptive validity and its useful-
ness as an organizing term. The paper offers an understanding of American 
exceptionalism that takes account of these critiques, and suggests how and 
why the concept retains considerable utility. It will highlight five compo-
nent characteristics of the concept that warrant particular attention, and con-
clude with some general observations on the enduring significance of 
America's distinctive character. 
I. 
Alexis de Tocqueville is credited with coining the term "American ex-
ceptionalism"; his two-volume Democracy in America may fairly be 
3. Godfrey Hodgson, Anti-Americanism and American Exceptionalism, 2 J. Transatlantic. 
Stud. 27, 34 (2004); see also Daniel T. Rodgers, American Exceptionalism Revisited, 24 Raritan 
21, 45 (Oct. I, 2004) ("After waning with the end of the Cold War, exceptionalist rhetoric has 
come back into American politics at full throat in the 'war against terrorism.' . . . The special 
mission of the United States, vis-a-vis all other nations, is declared once more. A new manifest 
destiny has been proclaimed, clothed by some in religious garb, pitched by others as the responsi-
bility of a unique, singular superpower that needs to take its imperial responsibilities seriously. 
On the campaign trail, obedience to the exceptionalist historical dispensation of the United States 
is still mandatory for every serious political candidate."); see also Dale Carter, Introduction: The 
Death and Life of an Exceptional Concept, in Marks of Distinction: American Exceptionalism 
Revisited II, 20 (Dale Carter ed., Aarhus U. Press 2001) ("[R]egardless of the shifting contours of 
academic debate, the American public continue for a variety of reasons to subscribe to a belief in 
the nation's distinctiveness."); Michael Barone, Introduction: American Politics in the Networking 
Era, in Almanac of American Politics 29 (Michael Barone & Richard Cohen eds., Nat. J. Group 
2006) (polling data confirms widespread belief in American exceptionalism). 
4. See Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism Reaffirmed, in Is America Differ-
ent? A New Look at American Exceptionalism 4 (Byron E. Shafer ed., Oxford U. Press 1991) 
(noting "thousands upon thousands" of such commentaries, especially by Europeans). For a re-
cent noteworthy example, see Bernard Henri Levy, American Vel1igo: Traveling America in the 
Footsteps of Tocqueville (Random House 2006) . 
5. See .Tames Mendelsohn, Writing, Criticism and the Imagination of Nation: American Ex-
ceptionalism and the Evolution of American Studies, in Marks of Distinction, supra n. 3, at 69-90. 
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viewed as the first comprehensive study of the topic. He joined the words 
"American" and "exceptionalism" in French, but they have stuck together 
in English ever since. Tocqueville's focus on America's distinctiveness 
stemmed from his desire to understand how the United States had produced 
a stable democracy by the 1830s, while efforts to do so in his native France 
had failed. He observed that, with the partial exception of England, no 
country anywhere at that time had so fully developed the principles of pop-
ular sovereignty and equality, together with democratic political forms and 
decentralized political structures, comparable to those in America. Toc-
queville's perceptions of American difference were not limited to politics, 
however. His observations of Americans' distinctive religious orientations, 
innumerable voluntary organizations, abundant economic opportunities, ex-
plicit rejection of inherited entitlements, and relative absence of social hier-
archies and elitist mores, have served as the bedrock for virtually all 
subsequent analyses of America's character.6 
It is often overlooked that Tocqueville, while he admired a great many 
things about America, did not construe exceptionalism to mean that the 
United States was a singularly wonderful nation, or had the finest govern-
6. For example, on religion in America: "Religious hatred does not exist in the United 
States, because religion is universally respected and no sect is dominant." Alexis de Tocqueville, 
Democracy in America 202 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., The Lib. of Am. 2004). 
In America, religion is a world apart in which the clergyman reigns but which he is 
careful never to leave. Within its confines he guides men's minds. Beyond those limits, 
he leaves them to their own devices and abandons them to the independence and insta-
bility intrinsic to their nature and to the times. 
Id. at 508. 
On voluntary organizations: "In American I came across types of associations which I con-
fess I had no idea existed, and I frequently admired the boundless skill of Americans in setting 
large numbers of people a common goal and inducing them to strive toward that goal voluntarily." 
Id. at 595. 
On economic opportunity: 
[Njearly all the tastes and habits born of equality are naturally conducive to commerce 
and industry. Take a man who is active, enlightened, free, well-off, and full of desires. 
He is too poor to live in idleness but wealthy enough to feel in no immediate fear of 
need, and he is thinking about improving his lot. ... Our man's mind is made up: he 
will sell his field, leave his home, and take up some risky but lucrative occupation .... 
[Pjeople of this sort abound in democratic societies, and as equality of their conditions 
becomes greater, their number increases. 
Id. at 644. 
On rejection of inherited entitlements and social hierarchies: 
Among democratic peoples, where there is no hereditary wealth, everyone works in 
order to live, or has worked, or was born to people who worked. . .. American servants 
do not feel degraded because they work, for everybody around them is working .... 
[Sjome occupations are more arduous or more lucrative than others, but they are neither 
high or low. 
Id. at 642-43. 
For Tocqueville's influence on subsequent discussions of American character, see generally 
Levy, supra n. 4; Michael Ledeen, Tocqueville on American Character (St. Martin's Press 2000); 
Seymour Martin Lipset, The Indispensability of Political Parties, 11 J. Democracy 48, 48-49 
(Jan. 2000) (discussing Tocqueville's analysis of American politics, especially the tendency to 
form associations). 
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ment or society. A careful observer of America's character, he thought he 
understood its darker side as well: 
My premise is that many people will take it upon themselves to 
proclaim the new goods that equality promises to mankind but 
few will dare warn of the perils that it holds in the offing. I have 
therefore focused primarily on those perils, and being convinced 
that I had clearly made them out, I was not so cowardly as to hold 
my tongue about them.7 
Of course, Tocqueville was not the first to suggest there was some-
thing special about the American experiment. The concept originated even 
before the first European settlers got off their boats. As they were about to 
disembark from the flagship Arbella at Plymouth Rock in 1630, John Win-
throp famously exhorted his "community of saints" that "we shall be as a 
city upon a hill," that theirs was a special destiny to found a new society 
bound by a covenant with God to be faithful to a set of higher ideals.8 
Exhortations of this sort had a profound influence upon European settlers' 
understanding of their lives in the New World, contrasting sharply with 
their experience of European societies ensnared in webs of perverse cus-
toms and decaying hierarchies. This conception of special mission, how-
ever, was not essentially self-congratulatory. To the contrary, it resonated 
with the highly contingent prophetic message of the Bible: the eyes of the 
Lord are upon you, for good or evil, and the stakes for you and the world 
are enormous.9 
This founding typology-that of a people setting out deliberately to 
form a "new" polity in a "new" land based on shared basic principles of 
7. Tocqueville, supra n. 6, at 480; see also Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptional-
ism 18 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1996) ("When Tocqueville or other[sj ... have used the term 
'exceptional' to describe the United States, they have not meant, as some critics of the concept 
assume, that America is better than other countries or has a superior culture. Rather, they have 
simply been suggesting that it is qualitatively different, that it is an outlier.") 
8. John Winthrop, A Modell of Christian Charity (1630) (available at http://his-
tory.hanover.edu/texts/winthmod.html). 
9. See e.g. Peter Bulkeley, Sermon, The Gospel Covenant, in Deborah L. Madsen, American 
Exceptionalism 19-20 (U. Press of Miss. 1998) ("We are as a city set upon a hill, in the open view 
of all the earth; the eyes of the world are upon us because we profess ourselves to be a people in 
covenant with God, and therefore not only the Lord our God, with whom we have made covenant, 
but heaven and earth, angels and men, that are witnesses of our profession, will cry shame upon 
us, if we walk contrary to the covenant which we have promised to walk in."). 
Seventeenth-century conceptions of special mission were heavily drawn from the Hebrew 
Bible's understanding of Israel's unique status in God's plan; indeed, such comparisons were 
frequently and explicitly made. While Israel had been singled out from among all the nations, that 
status imposed especially stringent moral obedience: "You only have I known of all the families 
of the earth; therefore, I will punish you for all your iniquities," declares the Lord in the Book of 
Amos. Amos 3:2 (Jewish Publication Socy. translation). Israel's entitlement even to basic security 
in its homeland is wholly dependent upon its strict adherence to the Law. See e.g. Deuteronomy 
28; see generally Robert Bellah, Beyond Belief' Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditional World 
(Harper & Row 1970); Kenneth Wald, Religion and Politics in the United States (St. Martin's 
Press 1987). 
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right and good-later found an Enlightenment expression during the period 
of the American Revolution. A widely read poem of the time proclaimed, 
So shall our nation, formed on Virtue's plan, 
Remain the guardian of the Rights of Man, 
A vast republic, famed through every clime, 
Without a king, to see the end of time. 10 
During this period Benjamin Franklin used the vocabulary of excep-
tionalism to present a secularized version of America's essential purpose, 
not a mission of believers on a religious errand into the wilderness, but a 
march of individuals seeking to create a new society purified by reason and 
common sense of the corruptions of European politics and a stratified class 
structure. Franklin recast the terms of success in America, reorienting them 
toward a culture of work, thrift, moral integrity, and fair-mindedness. He 
shared with the earlier Puritan visionaries, however, a firm conviction that 
America must be a model and a measure for the nations of the world, who 
would in turn subject it to stern judgment. 11 
Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century expressions of exceptionalist 
thinking expressed both the hopefulness and burden of new possibilities: 
that in America individuals have an opportunity and an obligation to create 
for themselves something altogether more uplifting and rewarding. To bor-
row from Richard Hofstadter, America was not founded upon particular 
ideologies, it became one itself.12 It is this conception that Tocqueville saw 
emerging on the ground in Jacksonian America: a self-reliant people, a 
product of many nationalities, possessed of abundant land, eager to take 
risks in pursuit of wealth and adventure, intolerant of inherited European 
heirarchies. 13 
This reading of American exceptionalism, of course, can easily slip 
into a more triumphalist claim, as Hodgson aptly describes it, that 
10. Philip Frenau, On Mr. Paine's Rights of Man, in Madsen, supra n. 9, at 38. 
11. See Benjamin Franklin, Information to Those Who Would Remove to America, http:// 
www.founding.com/libraryllbody .cfm ?id= 147 &parent=55 (1794); see generally H. W. Brands, 
First American: The Life and Times of Benjamin Franklin (Doubleday 2000); Walter Isaacson, 
Benjamin Franklin: An American Life (Simon & Schuster 2003); Edmund S. Morgan, Benjamin 
Franklin (Yale U. Press 2002). 
12. Lipset, supra n. 4, at 18. 
13. As expressed by a leading mid-twentieth-century Jacksonian historian: 
Exhilarated by the conviction that America was the pioneer in forging a new era for 
mankind, Americans in the Jacksonian period undertook a variety of experiments that 
were designed to broaden the area of freedom. They tested new religious faiths and 
philosophies . . . . Others undertook socialistic and communistic experiments . . . . 
Devoted humanitarians ministered to the deaf, the blind, and the insane; .... secular 
education was widened and its quality improved; a temperance movement gathered 
headway. There were crusades for peace, for women's rights, and for the abolition of 
slavelY. America was offering a challenge to the rest of the world, the challenge of a 
free society seeking a better way of life. 
Glyndon G. Van Deusen, The Jacksonian Era 2 (Harper & Brothers 1959); see also Alice Tyler, 
Freedom's Ferment 21-22 (Books for Libraries Press 1944). 
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American society, and the United States as a political power, are 
inherently more virtuous than other nations, and especially more 
so than the corrupt societies of the Old World. A corollary ... is 
that, as a consequence of the exceptional virtue of American po-
litical ideas and constitutional arrangements, it is the high duty of 
the United States to spread its virtues to as much of the rest of the 
world as possible. 14 
193 
This self-congratulatory understanding also has deep historical roots. 
Thomas Jefferson, in his 1781 Notes on the State of Virginia, described 
America as exceptional through a detailed description of its magnificent 
natural resources and agrarian life. America's wondrous natural landscape 
would provide fertile ground upon which to grow an exceptional people. 15 
By 1826, Jefferson had concluded not only that the grand experiment he 
and his founding generation started was succeeding, but that it was going to 
spread across the globe "to some parts sooner, to others later, but finally to 
all" the world. "[T]he unbounded exercise of reason and freedom of opin-
ion," he wrote just before his death, would convince all men that they were 
born not to be ruled by others, but to "assume [for themselves] the blessings 
[and] security of self-government."16 
Particularly during the Gilded Age and after, these sentiments assumed 
an all-too-often jingoistic and racist tone, a tone discernable, for example, 
in a speech by President Theodore Roosevelt, in which he lavished praise 
upon the "white races" for bettering the lives of indigenous peoples in 
North America, South America, and IndiaY Roosevelt was particularly 
proud of America's work in the Philippines; his praise reflected a mixture 
of democratic idealism and racial paternalism: 
[W]e are endeavoring to educate and train the native races under 
our sovereignty in the Philippines. . . . [S]elf-government can 
never be bestowed by outsiders upon any people. It must be 
achieved by themselves. It means in this sense primarily self-con-
trol, self-restraint, and if those qualities do not exist-that is, if 
the people are unable to govern themselves-then, as there must 
14. Hodgson, supra n. 3, at 35. 
15. Of course Jefferson was not alone in this perception: 
America, in the minds of its attentive European observers of the eighteenth century, was 
exceptional because its healthy, young, hardworking population had won a revolution-
ary prize of an empty continent on which to settle its freeborn progeny. America was 
exceptional because the familiar predators of ordinary folk-the extorting tax collector, 
the overbearing nobleman, the persecuting priest, the extravagant ruler-had failed to 
make the voyage across the Atlantic. Natural abundance, inhabitants schooled in toler-
ance, historic exemption from Old World social evils-these were the materials with 
which the European reform imagination worked to create the exceptional United States. 
Joyce Appleby, A Restless Past: History and the American Public 93 (Rowman & Littlefield 
2005). 
16. Ltr. ii'om Thomas Jefferson to Roger Wheightman (June 24, 1826) (available at http:// 
www.loc.gov/exhihits/jefferson/214.html). 
17. President Theodore Roosevelt, Speech, Expansions of the White Races (D.C., Jan. 18, 
1909) (available at hltp://www.theodore-roosevelt.com/trwhiteraces.html). 
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be government somewhere, it has to come from outside. But we 
are constantly giving to the people of the Philippines an increas-
ing share in, an increasing opportunity to learn by practice, the 
difficult art of self-government. ... We are leading them forward 
steadily in the right direction .... I believe that I am speaking 
with historic accuracy and impartiality when I say that the Ameri-
can treatment of and attitude toward the Filipino people, in its 
combination of disinterested ethical purpose and sound common 
sense, marks a new and long stride forward, in advance of all 
steps that have hitherto been taken, along the path of wise and 
proper treatment of weaker by stronger races. 18 
The justifications offered by President George W. Bush for the war in 
Iraq, as well as for his overall foreign policy in the Middle East, tap deeply 
into a different, but equally self-assured view of America's world mis-
sion. 19 At the swearing-in ceremony for his long-time protege Karen 
Hughes to serve as under secretary of state for public diplomacy and public 
affairs, President Bush declared, 
[S]preading the message of freedom requires an aggressive effort 
to share and communicate America's fundamental values .... 
Across the world, hearts and minds are opening to the message of 
human liberty as never before .... We must nurture freedom's 
progress. . . . [F]reedom is not America's gift to the world. . . . 
[F]reedom is the Almighty God's gift to every man, woman and 
child in this world. . . . America [must] seize this moment of 
opportunity by working with other nations and peoples to replace 
tyranny with tolerance, and overcome hatred with hope. Together, 
we're going to help millions achieve the non-negotiable demands 
18. Id. For a description of the paternalist and imperialist attitudes toward the Philippines in 
the Roosevelt admininstration, see for example, Edmund Morris, Theodore Rex 101-02 (Random 
House 2001); see also Theodore Roosevelt, Expansion and Peace (1899), in The Writings of 
Theodore Roosevelt 27, 32 (William Harbaugh ed., Bobbs-Merill 1967) ("Every expansion of 
civilization makes for peace. In other words, every expansion of a great civilized power means a 
victory for law, order, and righteousness."). 
19. The Bush administration's use of military force in Afghanistan and Iraq and its unilater-
alist foreign policy tendencies have raised concerns in many quarters. Exceptionalist questions 
inevitably arise in this context. Yale Law School Dean Harold Koh, for example, has argned that 
the United States projects five troublesome aspects of exceptionalism in its cun-ent international 
relations: a schizophrenic sense of its exceptional power, homeland security measures that include 
a claim of preemptive self-defense, creation of extralegal zones (Guantanamo Bay) and extralegal 
persons (enemy combatants), militarily imposed democracy creation in Afghanistan and Iraq, and 
strategic unilateralism combined with tactical multilateralism. Koh believes these are features of 
"bad exceptionalism" because they inhibit America's ability to provide beneficial international 
leadership ("good exceptionalism"). Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 Stan. 
L. Rev. 1479, 1497-1500 (2003). Koh expresses his ultimate hope for America's world mission 
thus: "As a nation conceived in liberty and dedicated to certain inalienable rights, the United 
States has strong primal impulses to respond to cdsis not just with power alone, but with power 
coupled with principle. After September 11, our challenge ... is not to condone double standards 
or to declare the human rights era over, but to use process to prod the country we love to follow 
the better angels of its national nature." Id. at 1527. 
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of human dignity so they can build a better life for their children, 
and so we can lay the foundation of peace for our children and 
grandchildren.20 
II. 
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Against these ideas of exceptionalism stand many critics; they may be 
described in three broad categories. First, there are those who freely con-
cede that America possesses some special characteristics, but they do not 
believe these make the United States in any way exceptional. America is in 
many ways like all other societies, they assert; in other ways it is like only 
some other societies; and in still other ways it may be truly unique. But this 
can be said of every society, given that each is shaped by particular physical 
and environmental forces, and distinctive development patterns?l Focusing 
on America's distinctive features may be emotionally satisfying for Ameri-
cans and serve nationalistic political purposes, but it does not prove that the 
United States is somehow an exemplary model for the world, or is exempt 
from decadence and decay like other historically predominant powers, or is 
uniquely able to chart its own historical course?2 
A second, harsher critique emphasizes America's exceptionalism, but 
sees it principally in a negative light. The United States, in this view, is 
unique in its glaring political hypocrisy, proclaiming itself founded on prin-
ciples of equality while perpetuating-indeed, expanding-slavery; in its 
enduring racism, domestic violence, and gaping economic inequalities; and 
in its imperialist foreign policy masked by rhetoric of expanding liberty and 
free markets.23 This political critique of American exceptionalism is usually 
20. George W. Bush, Speech, President Honors Ambassador Karen Hughes at Swearing-in 
Ceremony (D.C., Sept. 9, 2005) (available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/20051091 
20050909.html). David Hendrickson and Robert Tucker have attacked the notion that the global 
promotion of democracy is consistent with historical understandings of America's mission in the 
world. Quoting Daniel Webster (among others), they argue that America's true international mis-
sion is "not to propagate our opinions or impose upon other countries our form of government by 
artifice or force, but to teach by example and show by our success, moderation and justice, the 
blessings of self-government and the advantages of free institutions." David C. Hendrickson & 
Robert W. Tucker, The Freedom Crusade, 81 Natl. Interest 12, 14 (Fall 2005). 
21. As Shafer notes, "the problem is that all societies, observed closely enough, are distinc-
tive, while all societies, observed with sufficient distance, are simultaneously similar." Shafer, 
Preface, in Is America Different?, supra n. 4, at iv. 
22. See e.g. D. Bell, The Hegelian Secret: Civil Society alld American Exceptionalism, in 
Shafer, supra n. 4, at 50-51; Rodgers, supra n. 3, at 44 ("All nations are rich in differences. Their 
variations are extraordinarily complex and wide-ranging. But difference is a truism; in itself, it 
has never been the point in question."). 
23. See e.g. Howard Zinn, The Power and the Glory: Myths of American Exceptiollalism 
(available at http://bostonreview.net/BR30.3Izinn.html) ("The idea of a city on a hill is heartwarm-
ing .... In reality, we have never been just a city on a hill. A few years after Governor Winthrop 
uttered his famous words, the people in the city on a hill moved out to massacre the Pequot 
Indians .... [This] kind of massacre ... occurs again and again as Americans march west to the 
Pacific and south to the Gulf of Mexico .... Expanding into another territory, occupying that 
territory, and dealing harshly with people who resist occupation has been a persistent fact of 
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accompanied by at least an implicit demand for action to remedy the na-
tion's many bad characteristics.24 It is part of a multitude of national histo-
ries that view particular societies not as especially good, but especially 
troubled. 25 
An increasing number of American historians recently have offered a 
third critique of exceptionalism, one that asserts that the concept simply has 
run out of steam intellectually, distorting rather than clarifying Americans' 
experience. New historiography has erased traditional boundaries between 
"here" and "elsewhere," they claim, making it impossible to maintain the 
categories of distinctiveness that are central to an exceptionalist narrative. 
Recent histories of the United States do increasingly challenge the idea of a 
nationally focused narrative, drawing attention away from the supposedly 
unique features of America, toward transnational phenomena and forces,26 
This refocusing of historiographic narratives stems from two sources. 
First, the transnational trends that seem so obvious in the contemporary 
world-globalization of trade, culture, employment, knowledge, etc.27-
now appear to be the most important features of the past as well. From this 
perspective, historians conclude that a nation's distinctiveness is far less 
important than its interdependencies. Rather than highlight imagined excep-
tional characteristics about America, they believe it is more important to 
focus on "the features of present-day globalization [that] have been part of 
[American] history for over four centuries."28 
At a more basic level, however, this revisionist impulse arises from a 
sense that the exceptionalist project has led to a fundamental distortion of 
reality. Princeton historian Daniel Rodgers, for example, writes: 
American history from the first settlements to the present day. And this was often accompanied 
from very early on with a particular form of American exceptionalism: the idea that American 
expansion was divinely ordained."); Julia Sweig, Friendly Fire: Loosing Friends and Making 
Enemies in the Anti-American Century (Pub. Affairs 2006) (arguing that egregious American for-
eign policy blunders are largely to blame for pervasive anti-Americanism). 
24. Id.; see generally Neil Renwick, America's World Identity: The Politics of Exclusion (St. 
Martin's Press 2000). 
25. As Daniel Rodgers has observed, there is a "family of exceptionalist narratives [that] 
functions as stories not of celebration but of regret. Here the distinctiveness of the exceptional 
nation's history is its burden, its failure to catch hold of the general tendencies. Here one talks not 
about emancipation from the general rule, but about blockages, historical misalignments, deficits, 
and distortions." Rodgers, supra n. 3, at 27. 
26. As Rodgers states: "The melting pot, the frontier, and the timeless national political char-
acter of Americans are all powelfully embedded in the national consciousness and mythology. 
The symbolic repertoire of the Bush administration is saturated with their elements .... They seep 
everywhere into public talk, framing the language and imagery of popular American exceptional-
ism .... [E]ach of these claims of special national distinctiveness has been blurred by university-
based historians[.]" Id. at 32; see also Rethinking American History in the Global Age (Thomas 
Bender ed., U. of Cal. Press 2002); Bridging the Atlantic: The Question of American Exceptional-
ism in Perspective (Elisabeth Glaser & Herman Wellenreuther eds., Cambridge U. Press 2002). 
27. See generally Thomas L. Friedman, The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-
First Century (Farrar, Straus & Giroux 2005). 
28. Rodgers, supra n. 3, at 31. 
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Postulating a universal rule, while holding one's own nation ex-
empt from it, is to slip by necessity into a rhetoric of caricature 
and exaggeration. It manufactures an artificially homogenous 
"we" bounded off, by the sharpest of imagined contrasts, from a 
universalized "they" in the world beyond. But the boundary turns 
out not really to be solid at all?9 
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There is a good deal of truth in these three groups of critiques. Surely 
it is true that the United States shares many characteristics with other na-
tions. It is also true that these shared features are becoming more pro-
nounced as globalization accelerates at an unprecedented rate. But this does 
not negate the singular manner in which the United States has developed 
and continues to behave in the world, or its unique influence on global 
trends. Focusing on the nature of America's distinctive characteristics, what 
they are, how they originated, and how they affect the world, need not be 
accompanied by a claim that the United States is exempt from historical 
forces common to other societies, or is uniquely capable of determining its 
own fate. 30 
Similarly, a focus on American exceptionalism need not obscure those 
features of America's past and present that paint any ugly picture, or sug-
gest a need for reform. While much exceptionalist discourse has been ori-
ented to demonstrating American virtue, it has from the very beginning also 
been accompanied by a deeply embedded strain of moral urgency and chas-
tisement.31 Indeed, without an emphasis on exceptionalism, the reformist 
and radical critiques of American politics lose much of their force. Ameri-
can exceptionalism has never been synonymous with American triumphal-
ism, nor has such a focus merely been satisfying for domestic political 
purposes, though it is surely that in some measure. 
Finally, no one can doubt that globalization has become a primary 
prism through which to evaluate historical developments, and it would be 
strange indeed if contemporary American historiography did not manifest 
this as well. An enormous volume of American history has been written 
recently from this post-exceptionalist perspective, most notably studies fo-
cusing on the "borderlands" of American geography and society, and Amer-
ican immigrants' "diaspora" experiences. Yet, as with many new academic 
theories, there is a marked tendency here toward conceptual imperialism, an 
urge to see older historiographical structures as no longer viable at all and 
requiring subordination to the new theory. 32 
29. /d. at 29-30. 
30. See e.g. Andrew Kohut & Bruce Stokes, America Against the World 41-67 (Times 
Books 2006) (offering an abundance of survey data reflecting America's enduring distinctiveness; 
the authors conclude that many of Tocqueville's observations remain valid today). 
31. See supra n. 10 and accompanying text. 
32. Those who imagine that recent post-exceptionalist scholarship has completely superseded 
the post-World War II liberal consensus perspective should re-read Louis Hartz, the leading ex-
positor of that orientation. See e.g. Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (Harcourt, 
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While a transnational focus enriches our historical understanding of 
certain issues, it is readily apparent that it is not as helpful in answering 
other important questions, for example, how the United States emerged as 
the world's hegemonic military power in our time; why it will likely con-
tinue to play that role in the foreseeable future; how the United States 
emerged as the world's leading national economy and why it continues to 
produce vastly disproportionate technological innovation; why America 
continues to be by far the most religious of advanced western societies and 
why traditional religious ideas continue to serve as a principal means of 
individual self-understanding and national focus; and how the African 
American experience of slavery and racism has left such an indelible stain 
on the nation's character. It simply cannot be denied that understanding the 
distinctiveness of American politics, its economy, religious traditions and 
struggle for racial equality, among other features, helps answer critically 
important questions that other conceptual lenses may obscure. 
The next section illuminates five clusters of American characteris-
tics: 33 ideals, political institutions, economy, religion, and the legacy of 
slavery and race discrimination. Voluminous empirical evidence and analy-
ses describe the character and salience of these clusters, and it would be 
unproductive to rehearse it all here. Instead, the next section simply high-
lights the salience of these five clusters of characteristics, noting how they 
are distinctively American, especially when understood together. Their in-
tersection provides a basic foundation for Americans to understand them-
selves, and for others to appreciate how and why the United States behaves 
the way it does in the world. 
III. 
Ideals. All societies are affected by particularly powerful foundational 
principles that focus and orient communal behavior. Such principles are 
deeply internalized within social structures and group psychology, and are 
often referenced explicitly by political and cultural leaders in order to moti-
vate and justify group behavior. Because America was a new nation deliber-
ately created by certain men at a particular time and place to achieve certain 
aims, its ideals are especially transparent and closely connected with the 
very status of American peoplehood.34 
Brace & World 1955) [hereinafter Liberal Tradition]; The Founding of New Societies (Harcourt, 
Brace & World 1964). They may be surprised by his nuanced articulation of America's distinc-
tiveness, as well as his critique of progressive historians' refusal to engage in any serious "objec-
tive comparative analysis of the nation." Liberal Tradition, supra n. 32, at 255. 
33. The term is borrowed from Is America Different?, supra n. 4, at viii, which suggests four 
"peculiarly American approaches" to societal phenomena: populism, individualism, democratiza-
tion, and market-making. Shafer emphasizes the "conjoint and reinforcing character" of these 
clusters in American history as being the essence of its exceptionalism. Id. at 259. 
34. See generally Seymour Martin Lipset, The First New Nation: The United States in His-
torical and Comparative Perspective (W.W. Norton & Co. 1963). 
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The Declaration of Independence declares these ideals with ringing 
clarity.35 Seymour Martin Lipset has summarized this "American Creed" in 
five terms: "liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, populism, and laissez-
faire."36 For Lipset, this Creed is a constitutive feature of being American: 
"In Europe, nationality is related to community, and thus one cannot be-
come un-English or un-Swedish. Being an American, however, is an ideo-
logical commitment. It is not a matter of birth. Those who reject American 
values are un-American."37 
Of course, an inherent and potentially explosive tension exists within 
this set of American ideals, namely that between liberty and equality. In our 
day that tension appears pervasively in conflicts between so-called libertari-
ans and liberals.38 But the tension was not apparent to Jefferson or those to 
whom his rhetoric held such visceral appeal. On the contrary, Jefferson was 
convinced that the political and economic freedom that America offered 
would gradually wash away arbitrary social differences separating individu-
als by class and upbringing.39 
We now know that it didn't quite work that way. What is important for 
our purpose, however, is not so much whether liberty actually has promoted 
equality for most Americans, but rather the reality of these twin concepts as 
inseparable, widely shared ideals-principles that Americans consider to be 
joined together and appropriate upon which to establish their society. And 
not just their society. Most American presidents, especially twentieth-cen-
tury presidents, have asserted America's privilege and duty to defend these 
twin principles in one form or another as humankind's universal 
birthright. 40 
Political Institutions. 41 Americans overwhelmingly take great pride in 
their constitutional heritage, but few understand its most basic characteris-
tics. Popular elections are often thought to be the core of our democratic 
government, but they are by no means the most important feature of 
35. See O. K. Chesterton, What I Saw in America 7 (Dodd, Mead & Co. 1922) ("America is 
the only nation in the world that is founded on a creed. That creed is set forth with dogmatic and 
even theological lucidity in the Declaration of Independence.") (quoted in Lipset, supra n. 7, at 
31). Thomas Jefferson's oracular articulation in the Declaration of America's foundational ideals 
is perhaps his greatest legacy. "Jefferson," writes Joyce Appleby, "more than any other leader, had 
a vision of what America should stand for .... [His] great contribution was not intellectual-not 
the creation of a coherent and logical philosophy-but ideological-the fusing of emotionally 
charged convictions into a single discursive grid." Appleby, supra n. IS, at 20-21. 
36. Lipset, supra n. 7, at 19. 
37. Id. at 31. 
38. The debate over affirmative action in higher education is one obvious example. See e.g. 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
39. Appleby, supra n. IS, at 34. 
40. See e.g. Koh, supra n. 19 and accompanying text. 
41. See Aaron Wildavsky, Resolved, the Individualism and Egalitariansim Be Made Compat-
ible ill America: Political-Cultural Roots of Exceptionalsim, in Is America Different?, supra n. 4, 
at 116. ("Everyone who studies American politics ... comes away feeling that it is special in 
some significant way without quite being able to specify precisely what that is. Me too."). 
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America's distinctive political heritage, and do not guarantee a government 
hospitable to the ideals Americans associate with their own democracy.42 
The Founders did not rely upon direct popular election as the means to 
control governmental power. Instead, they institutionalized separation of 
powers, checks and balances, strictly limited federal authority, and states' 
rights, as chief bulwarks against tyranny. As Madison wrote, 
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by 
the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and 
then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and 
separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights 
of the people. The different governments will controul each other; 
at the same time that each will be controuled by itself.43 
Abuse of power would be precluded "by so contriving the interior 
structure of the government, as that its several constituent parts may, by 
their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper 
places."44 Separation of powers and federalism were the essential features 
to assure liberty in the constitutional framework created by the Founders, 
and they remain today distinctive characteristics of American government. 
Few if any other nations rely to this degree upon such formal structural 
demarcations of authority to assure individual freedom.45 
Similarly, the judicially supervised, rights-based legal culture that 
Americans today rely upon as a primary tool to limit governmental author-
42. President George W. Bush has sought to make this point in describing his foreign policy 
goals: "[TJhe United States of America supports democratic reform across the broader Middle 
East. Elections are vital, but they are only the beginning. Raising up a democracy requires the rule 
of law, and protection of minorities, and strong, accountable institutions that last longer than a 
single vote." George W. Bush, President Bush Delivers State of the Union Address, http:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/01l20060131-1O.html(Jan. 31, 2006); see George W. 
Bush, President Meets with Victims of Saddam Hussein, Discusses Progress, http:// 
www .whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/0l/20060118-1.html (Jan. 18, 2006). 
43. James Madison, The Federalist No. 51, in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison & John 
Jay, The Federalist Papers 261, 264 (Gary Wills ed., Bantam Books 1982). 
44. Id. at 261. Madison and the founders certainly relied upon Montesquieu, Locke, and 
more generally upon seventeenth-century English radical political writers for their ideas about 
separation of powers. What is critical for our purpose, however, is how these earlier separation of 
powers ideas and theories of mixed government were transformed by the founding generation into 
a new conception that all government power, whatever its origin, was indistinguishable, poten-
tially dangerous, and required diffusion, in addition to checks and balances. See Gordon Wood, 
The Creation of the American Republic 150-61, 446-53 (U. of N.C. Press 1969); see generally 
Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Sec/orum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution (U. Press 
of Kan. 1985). 
45. See e.g. John W. Kingdon, America the Unusual 7-10 (St. Martin'slWorth Pub. 1999) 
("what is so distinctive about the United States is the combination of separation of powers with 
federalism .... There are legitimate differences of opinion about whether this extraordinary frag-
mentation is a good thing or not, ... but factually, that is the state of affairs."); Seymour Martin 
Lipset, Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada (Rout-
ledge Press 1990); Vincent Ostrom, The Meaning of American Federalism: Constituting a Self-
Governing Society, 250-55 (lCS Press 1991); see generally Margaret Derthick, Keeping the Com-
pound Republic: Essays on American Federalism (Brooldngs lnst. Press 2001). 
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ity was of negligible importance in the original scheme.46 The Founders at 
the Philadelphia Convention considered the federal government to possess 
only enumerated, limited, and separated powers, granted by the people and 
the several states for specific public purposes. Under this conception a bill 
of rights was, as Hamilton observed, "not only unnecessary in the proposed 
Constitution but would even be dangerous," implying perhaps that rights 
not guaranteed in the bill were not protected. Bills of rights, Hamilton said, 
"have no application to constitutions professedly founded upon the power 
of the people, and executed by their immediate representatives and servants. 
Here, in strictness, the people surrender nothing, and as they retain every 
thing they have no need of particular reservations."47 
Of course, anti-Federalist and other agitation quickly resulted in con-
gressional passage of the Bill of Rights, which, as Jefferson and Madison 
emphasized, could be used by the judiciary as an additional check to protect 
the people's liberties.48 The check lay largely dormant for 150 years. But in 
the postwar period the United States Supreme Court vastly enlarged the 
scope and importance of federal constitutional rights, placing their judicial 
enforcement at the pinnacle of importance, beyond reach of conventional 
legislation and politics, and indeed, beyond anything imagined by the 
founding generation.49 
The distinctiveness of this development lies not only in the pervasive-
ness of constitutional rights consciousness in the United States, but in the 
equally pervasive, accepted American practice of challenging the validity of 
governmental activities principally through formal adjudication, not polit-
ics.50 The idea that political disputes in America inevitably transform into 
46. See Wood, supra n. 44, at 536. ("A bill of rights had scarcely been discussed in the 
Philadelphia Convention. As [James] Wilson remarked, it had 'never struck the mind of any 
member,' until George Mason almost as an afterthought in the last days of the Convention brought 
the issue up, when it was defeated by every state.") 
47. Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 84, in The Federalist Papers, supra n. 43, at 
436-37. Hamilton contrasted the need for reservations of rights in states where sovereignty rested 
with the king, with the creation of a government by the people in whom full sovereignty rested, 
and who delegated certain limited powers to the government "to secure the blessings of liberty to 
ourselves and our posterity .... " Here, Hamilton wrote, "is a better recognition of popular rights 
than volumes of those aphorisms ... in several of our State bills of rights, ... which would sound 
much better in a treatise of ethics than in a constitution of government." ld. at 437. 
48. See Wood, supra n. 44, at 543. 
49. See e.g. Eric Foner, The Story of American Freedom 302 (W. W. Norton & Co. 1998) 
(noting that the Supreme Court has not only "assumed the power to oversee the fairness of demo-
cratic procedures at the state and local level," but has "vastly expanded the substantive protection 
of the civil rights and civil liberties of all Americans ... [and] discovered entirely new rights in 
response to the rapidly changing contours of American society."); Larry Kramer, The People 
Themselves 250 (Oxford U. Press 2004) ("when our Founding Fathers wrote no one had yet 
imagined anything even remotely like modern judicial supremacy."). 
50. See e.g. Jody Pennington, 'Against Any Winds that Blow': American Exceptionalisl11, 
Multiculturalism, and Judicial Review, in Marks of Distinction, supra n. 3, at 257, 264. 
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legal ones goes back to Tocqueville.51 But the claim that the Bill of Rights 
can-and should-be used as a conventional political weapon, and that the 
courts are the primary field of battle for its use, is largely a twentieth-cen-
tury creation of the Supreme Court.52 A striking feature of American consti-
tutional history is that until the 1960s a vital tension existed between the 
judiciary's role in determining fundamental principles of government, on 
the one hand, and democratic decision making expressed through elected 
officials, on the other. Since that time a broad consensus has emerged that 
judicial determinations of the fundamental meaning of the Constitution are 
final and binding on all other branches of government, and even on the 
people themselves.53 
By contrast, in Britain, judicial review of acts of Parliament is nowhere 
near as broad, and historically was widely rejected elsewhere in Europe as 
well. Both the English constitutional and continental civil law traditions 
view parliament as the only legitimate source of law. The recent rise of 
"constitutional courts" in Europe and the development of international 
human rights laws that are enforceable judicially, for example, in litigation 
51. Tocqueville, supra n. 6, at 111-16. "There is virtually no political question in the United 
States that does not sooner or later resolve itself into a judicial question" [d. at 310. Tocqueville's 
observation is widely accepted as a basic tenet of American government. See e.g. Ruth Gavison, 
Holmes's Heritage: Living Greatly in the Law, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 843, 869 (1998) (Tocqueville's 
conclusion represents "one of the defining marks of the American political community .... "); but 
cf Mark A. Graber, Resolving Political Questions into Judicial Questions: Tocqueville's Thesis 
Revisited, 21 Const. Comment. 485 (2004). 
52. See e.g. W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) ("The very purpose 
of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, 
to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles 
to be applied by the courts."); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) ("[Marbury v. Madison] 
declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the 
Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a 
permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system."); see also U.S. v. Nixon, 418 
U.S. 683 (1974); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Cooper's retrojection of judicial supremacy 
back into Marbury is widely regarded as a self-serving anachronism: 
[The Marshall Court] strove to reconcile popular will and legal principle, not to make 
one either superior or subservient to the other. They had no intention of behaving as the 
Supreme Court ultimately would in Cooper v. Aaron . ... Unlike the Justices in Cooper, 
Marshall and his colleagues did not declare themselves to be the ultimate arbiters of the 
nation's constitutional policy choices, with power to bind coordinate branches of gov-
ernment to their judgments of constitutionality and thereby invalidate popularly sup-
ported legislative politics inconsistent with the constitutional values they favored. 
William Nelson, Marbury v. Madison and the Establishment of Judicial Autonomy, 27 J. Sup. Ct. 
Hist. 240, 249 (2002); see also Kramer, supra n. 49, at 221 (describing the above-cited declaration 
in Cooper as "just bluster and puff," and noting that "[t]he Justices in Cooper were not reporting a 
fact so much as trying to manufacture one .... "). 
53. As Kramer observes: 
The acceptance of judicial authority is most apparent ... in the all-but-complete disap-
pearance of public challenges to the Justices' supremacy over constitutional law .... 
[E]veryone nowadays seems willing to accept the Court's word as final-and to do so, 
moreover, regardless of the issue, regardless of what the Justices say, and regardless of 
the Court's political complexion. Opposition has become a matter of working to change 
either the Court's mind or its composition. 
Kramer, supra n. 49, at 228. 
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before the European Court of Human Rights, bear the unmistakable imprint 
of twentieth-century American constitutional experience. 54 
These features-separation of powers, checks and balances, federal-
ism, and a judicially managed, individual rights legal structure-are 
overlaid with a unique abundance of popular voting opportunities designed 
to bring American government closer to the people. These include a distinc-
tively American primary system used to select party candidates to stand for 
both federal and state general elections; widespread popular voting on legis-
lative initiatives and referenda; and election of local and state prosecutors, 
judges, and thousands of other functionaries who in virtually every other 
country are selected by other government or party officials. America has far 
more elections than any other contemporary nation. 55 Together with 
America's unique, enduring utilization of grand and petit juries in criminal 
and civil matters, these arrangements demonstrate an exceptional populist 
impulse. Gary Wills has aptly summarized this aspect of Americans' con-
ception of government as "provincial, amateur, authentic, spontaneous, can-
did, homogeneous, traditional, popular, organic, rights-oriented, religious, 
voluntary, participatory, and rotational," in contrast with other nations' con-
ception as "cosmopolitan, expert, authoritative, efficient, confidential, ... 
progressive, elite, mechanical, duties-oriented, secular, regulatory, and dele-
gative .... "56 
To sum up, there are at least three exceptional features of American 
political institutions: diffusion of governmental authority through a variety 
of formal structures; a rights-based legal culture defined and managed by 
the judiciary; and a profusion of popular voting opportunities. While each 
feature is distinctive in its own right, the interplay between them is also 
remarkable. To take one obvious example: Americans overwhelmingly op-
pose unelected judges making policy, or even making law, and they are 
deeply suspicious of policymakers off in Washington. Yet poll after poll 
over many years suggests widespread acceptance of the legitimacy of Su-
preme Court decisions.57 Even in the context of deciding the outcome of a 
presidential election, an overwhelming majority of Americans not only ac-
54. See generally R. C. van Caenegem, An Historical Introduction to Western Constitutional 
Law 159 (Cambridge u. Press 1995); Louis Henkin, Rights: American and Human, 79 Cohlln. L. 
Rev. 415 (1979); Constitutionalism and Rights: The Influence of the United States Constitiution 
Abroad (Louis Henkin & Albert J. Rosenthal eds., Colum. U. Press 1990). 
55. There are over a half million elected officials in the United States, roughly one for every 
360 persons of voting age. It is estimated that over one million United States election contests 
take place every four years. Yet, while opportunities to vote proliferate in America, voter turnout 
is low relative to other countries. The reasons for this apparent anomaly are complex and varied. 
Lipset, supra n. 7, at 43-46. 
56. Garry Wills, A Necessary Evil: A Histo/y of American Distrust of Government 17-18 
(Simon & Schuster 1999). 
57. See e.g. Kramer, supra n. 49, at 252 n. 11; see also Pennington, supra n. 50, at 266 
("Americans do not agree on the legitimacy of judicial review but they accept the power of the 
Court to exercise it."). 
204 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 3:2 
cepted the legitimacy of the Supreme Court determining whether Al Gore 
or George W. Bush should be president in 2001, but believed that the Su-
preme Court was the best institution to make that decision. 58 
Economy. American faith in the overall beneficence of a laissez-faire 
economic system has been buttressed by a number of historical factors. 
First, for most of American history there were vast stretches of "free land" 
in favorable climates that were relatively accessible to markets. A second 
factor was the relatively limited economic power of large landowners, at 
least after the Civil War, making possible a broad diffusion of economic 
opportunity for many. Third, large-scale immigration to the United States-
stimulated in part by these two factors-in turn produced an extraordinary 
rate of population growth. The United States continues to see itself-and 
continues to be seen by millions of would-be immigrants-as an economic 
frontier where opportunity beckons.59 Finally, the government has played 
only a limited role in regulating market capitalism. Even with the dramatic 
increase of Depression-era federal regulatory activity (and, to a lesser de-
gree, state economic regulation), the American economy has been distin-
guished from other national economies by its degree of reliance on market 
competition and individual initiative.60 
The result, as noted at the beginning of this article, has been excep-
tional economic performance. Throughout the twentieth century the United 
States led the world in both per capita real income and job creation.61 On 
58. Jeffrey M. Jones, Public Willing to Accept Supreme Court as Final Arbiter of Election 
Dispute, http://poll.gallup.com!contentldefault.aspx?ci=2224&pg=1 (Dec. 12, 2000). Neither of 
the coordinate branches appears eager to circumscribe the Supreme Court's assumption of ulti-
mate power over constitutional principles. See Kramer, supra n. 49, at 252 ("the Court's conduct 
must be quite provocative and very unpopUlar, usually over a sustained period, before it will 
produce actual legislative or executive countermeasures."). 
59. As Senator Edward Kennedy put it in a speech delivered nearly forty years ago, America 
is "the land of opportunity. Our streets may not be paved with gold, but they are paved with the 
promise that men and women who live here-even strangers and newcomers-can rise as fast, as 
far as their skills will allow." Carl Hulse, Kennedy Immigration Tack Vexes Democratic Leaders, 
N.Y. Times A16 (Apr. 12,2006) (quoting Senator Kennedy in a 1966 speech). Similar sentiments 
expressed by RepUblicans, including President George W. Bush and Senator John McCain, sug-
gest a broad consensus favoring an immigration policy that accommodates working immigrants. 
Id.; George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Washington, D.C., Jan. 31, 2006) (available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/0 1120060 131-1 O.html). 
60. Seymour Martin Lipset summarized these developments as follows: 
The United States, almost from its start, has had an expanding economic system. The 
nineteenth-century American economy, as compared to the European ones, was charac-
terized by more market freedom, more individual landownership, and a higher wage 
income structure-all sustained by a national classical liberal ideology. From the 
Revolution on, it was the laissez-faire country par excellence. 
Lipset, supra n. 7, at 54. 
6l. Id. at 55-60. Since 1985, the American economy has created over 35 million new jobs. 
See u.S. Dept. Lab., Bureau Lab. Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/webapps/legacy/cpsatab6.htm; se-
lect Total, 16 Years Over/Seasonally Adjusted, search 1985 to 2006 (last accessed May 3, 2006) 
(from 106,302,000 jobs in January 1985 to 143,074,000 jobs in January 2006). American labor 
productivity increases have outstripped European and Japanese competitors. See e.g. U.S. Dept. 
Lab., Bureau Lab. Statistics, Table 1.1. Output per Hour in Manufacturing, 15 Countries or Ar-
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the other hand, there is ample evidence that the American economic model 
has failed to produce adequate results relative to many other western na-
tions in critical areas-reducing poverty and income inequality,62 and pro-
viding universal healthcare at reasonable cost, among them.63 
The point, therefore, cannot be that the American economy has pro-
duced uniformly desirable outcomes or is uniquely capable of doing so. 
Rather, its exceptional performance over many generations has served to 
confirm the "fit" between a laissez-faire economic model emphasizing indi-
vidual initiative, on the one hand, and most Americans' expectations and 
experience of real economic improvement, on the other. 64 
Another especially significant characteristic of Americans' wealth ac-
cumulation is philanthropy. To an extent unequaled elsewhere, Americans 
are encouraged to not just create wealth, but to part with it voluntarily. 65 
This is rooted at least partly in Puritan ideals of frugality and industry that 
historically exerted such strong influence over American attitudes on finan-
cial matters, as well as in Americans' longstanding attachment to volunteer-
ism.66 No matter its source, the desire of many wealthy Americans to use 
their wealth to a significant extent for social causes is an important facet of 
American economic exceptionalism.67 The American philanthropic tradi-
tion that came to life in the days of Andrew Carnegie, who believed that the 
very wealthy should administer their estates as "a public trust during life,"68 
eas, 1950-2004 (Feb. 2006) (available at ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/ForeignLabor/prod-
suppt01.txt) (In 2004, U.S. workers rated 186 on the Manufacturing Output per Hour Index; in 
comparison, Japan rated 165.1 and Germany rated 149.0.). 
62. The United States has the highest proportion of people living in poverty among devel-
oped nations, and is one of the most unequal in income distribution. Lipset, supra n. 7, at 76. 
63. There are 45 million Americans without health insurance. Steven Greenhouse, Labor 
Chief Urges Action on Health, N.Y. Times A17 (Jan. 19,2006). 
64. Arnon Gutfeld, in a clear-eyed, generally critical assessment, offered the following 
description of the "very special dynamics of the developing American economy": 
In spite of recessions, depressions, and cycles of retreat, the real income of American 
laborers steadily increased. They did not feel a need to rebel, to support revolution, or 
to step outside the accepted economic and political structure in order to achieve concrete 
gains, and they almost always opposed suggestions for radical change to the system .... 
[TJhey were staunch defenders of the Constitution, especially the protection of property. 
Arnon Gutfe1d, American Exceptionalism: The Effects of Plenty on the American Experience xvii 
(2002). 
65. See Zoltan J. Acs & Ronnie J. Phillips, Entrepreneurship and Philanthropy in American 
Capitalism, 19 Small Bus. Econ. 189, 189 (2002). 
66. 1d. at 192; see also Merle Curti, American Philanthropy and the National Character, 10 
Am. Q. 420, 422 (1958). 
67. Charitable giving among the wealthiest Americans has tripled in the last decade, accord-
ing to figures compiled by Slate. Com and the Chronicle of Philanthropy. See David Plotz, Com-
petitive Philanthropy, http://www.slate.com/id12136385/) (Feb. 20, 2006); The 50 Most Generous 
Philanthropists, Bus. Week 61 (Nov. 28, 2005). Based on figures from 2001 and 2003, the top 
100 corporate philanthropists give more than ten times as much as the top 100 British corporate 
philanthropists. Stephen Brammer and Stephen Pavelin, COI]}orate Community Contributions in 
the United Kingdom and the United States, 56 J. Bus. Ethics 15, 17 (2005). 
68. Acs & Phillips, supra n. 65, at 193 (referring to Andrew Carnegie, The Gospel of Wealth 
(F.C. Hagen & Co. 1889». 
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continues to thrive: Bill and Melinda Gates have provided over $22 billion 
to fund world health initiatives through their foundation. 69 America's great-
est universities and libraries exist today largely as the realized dreams of its 
wealthiest citizens. Americans' tolerance-active encouragement, really-
of allowing vast wealth to remain under the control of thousands of private 
boards and individuals with a myriad of diverse charitable objectives is an-
other measure of American society's peculiar preference for diffused, pri-
vate decision making and against centralized, governmental planning tools 
to achieve communal objectives. 
Religion. Since Edmund Burke and Tocqueville, innumerable volumes 
have been written about America's special religious character and its rela-
tionship to entrepreneurial capitalism, democratic norms, and egalitarian, 
individualistic, and populist values. The habit of Americans to form volun-
tary associations of all kinds has long included religious affiliations-
America was the first country in which one's own religious identity became 
a matter of individual, voluntary association. Unlike Europe, where separa-
tion of church from state was motivated by anticlerical sentiment, in the 
United States such separation was motivated simply by the need to keep 
government neutral among many competing sects. Far from manifesting 
any deep-seated hostility to religious devotion, in America religious free-
dom meant just that-freedom to be religious, but on one's own terms, not 
the government's. 
And Americans are religious, indeed. Recent survey data seem to con-
firm Tocqueville's early nineteenth-century assessment that "there is no 
country in the world where ... religion retains a greater influence over the 
souls of men than in America." At a minimum, this appears to be true in 
comparison with other economically advanced societies.70 
But it is the peculiar form which religiosity assumes in America that is 
more significant than its breadth. In America the terms of one's religion are 
derived more commonly from one's conscience, not from the state or a 
church hierarchy. Early Protestant dissenting traditions left an indelible im-
pression on American religious outlooks, "call[ing] on Americans to be 
moralistic, to follow their conscience with an unequivocal emphasis not to 
be found in countries whose predominant denominations have evolved from 
state churches."71 Opinion polls suggest that Americans have a pronounced 
tendency toward utopian moralism, toward institutionalizing virtue and leg-
islating against wickedness. "Americans," says Lipset, "tend to view social 
69. Id. at 199. 
70. Lipset, supra n. 7, at 62-63. According to Kohut and Stokes, "nowhere is the unique 
global positioning of America more apparent or important than with respect to religion. . . . Polls 
show huge transatlantic gaps in religious behaviors and attitudes. Compared to Europeans, Amer-
icans express more faith in God, attend church more often, pray more often. They are closer to 
Muslims than to Europeans with respect to observance and cOlrnnitment, as well as attitudes of 
personal morality .... " Kohut & Stokes, supra n. 30, at 62. 
71. Lipset, supra n. 7, at 63. 
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and political dramas as morality plays, as battles between God and the 
Devil, so that compromise is virtually unthinkable."72 
Of course, these attitudes have a profound impact on American foreign 
policy, a subject with which Americans generally lack detailed familiarity, 
and therefore respond to based on beliefs and principles, rather than on 
pragmatic considerations. This moralism is particularly pronounced on 
questions of war and peace. Large numbers of Americans opposed the War 
of 1812, the Mexican War, the Civil War, World War I, the Korean War 
and, of course, the war in Vietnam, based on moral principles. Those who 
supported these conflicts correspondingly viewed them as moral crusades 
that had to be fought to the bitter end, if need be?3 
Slavery and Race Discrimination. No other socioeconomic phenomena 
have had the impact on America's laws, values, and attitudes as the en-
slavement of African Americans and the racism that fueled the "peculiar 
institution," and transcends it to this day. The enduring impact on African 
Americans of this history, and white America's struggle to address it, have 
formed the most painful component of American exceptionalism. As 
Michael Ignatieff observes: 
It's impossible to untangle the contradictions of American free-
dom without thinking about Jefferson and the spiritual abyss that 
separates his pronouncement that "all men are created equal" 
from the reality of the human beings he owned, slept with and 
never imagined as fellow citizens. American freedom aspires to 
be universal, but it has always been exceptional because America 
is the only modern democratic experiment that began in slavery.74 
Perhaps the only salutary result of this tragic legacy of slavery and 
discrimination is the impetus it created over many years for its own tran-
scendence. As Ignatieff puts it, 
Without the slave-owning Jefferson, no Martin Luther King Jr. 
and the dream of white and black citizens together reaching the 
Promised Land. Jefferson's words have had the same explosive 
72. ld.; see also Kohut & Stokes, supra n. 30, at 105-06 (most Americans think it is neces-
sary to believe in God in order to be a moral person). 
73. Lipset, supra n. 7, at 63. A different sort of dichotomy exists today. While 70% of 
Americans believe it is a good thing that American ideas and practices are spreading around the 
world, few feel that actively promoting democracy should be a national priority. Kohut & Stokes, 
supra n. 30, at 46-47. 
74. Mark 19natieff, Who Are Americans to Think That Freedom Is Theirs to Spread? N.Y. 
Times Mag. (June 26, 2005) (available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/ksgnews/Features/opeds/ 
062605_ignatieff.htm). As Joyce Appleby notes, "the master passion of Jefferson's revolutionary 
generation was not to build a multiracial society but rather to erect republics for white men." 
Appleby, supra n. 15, at 34. Of course, Jefferson himself was acutely aware of the moral and 
political cesspool created by slavery, famously writing, "I tremble for my country when I reflect 
that God is just, and that his justice cannot sleep forever." Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of 
Virginia 161 (William Peden ed., Norton 1982). A declared enemy of slavery, he was simultane-
ously deeply and personally implicated in all of its evil details, and did little if anything to dis-
lodge its increasing stranglehold on the South. 
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force abroad. American men and women in two world wars died 
believing that they had fought to save the freedom of strangers. 
And they were not deceived.75 
Today school children across America have a better understanding of 
who Martin Luther King, Jf. was, and what he stood for, than they do 
Thomas Jefferson; indeed, King's dream speaks to them more clearly than 
Madison's or Adams's or Washington's. 
It is no exaggeration to say that the nation's contemporary rights-
based, judicially enforced legal culture stems directly from its tragic en-
counter with slavery and racism. The Civil War Amendments' expansive 
guarantees of due process and equal protection, their extrapolation to gen-
der, disability, and economic discrimination, and the subordination of 
states' rights to federal authority, all derive from that encounter.76 
IV. 
It is often said that Americans fail to understand other nations, socie-
ties, and cultures with whom we interact. The United States has not suffi-
ciently emphasized the study of non-English languages in its schools, or the 
multitude of ways in which other peoples organize their political, economic, 
and religious communities.77 But if this is true, it is also true that others 
have made little or no effort to understand the United States on its own 
terms, with its own distinctive traits. Too often, efforts to analyze 
America's current behavior-domestic and international-are marred by 
gross misapprehensions and caricatures based on a lack of awareness of the 
United States' unique past and character.78 Even its professed "friends" find 
it tempting to believe they understand America because they read American 
75. Ignatieff, supra n. 74; see also Pennington, supra n. 50, at 272 (UThe universality of the 
claim [of the Declaration of Independence] has made it possible for groups other than those who 
originally asserted it to make it their own."). 
76. Anyone dOUbting that race continues to be a leitmotif of conflict in America need only 
observe how our national debates are framed over such disparate issues as educational policy, 
healthcare reform, and even response to natural disasters. See e.g. James Dao, In New Orleans, 
Smaller May Mean Whiter, 41 N.Y. Times (Jan. 22, 2006) (U[R]ace has become a subtext for just 
about every contentious decision the city faces: where to put FEMA trailers; which neighborhoods 
to rebuild; how the troubled school system should be reorganized; when elections should be 
held."). 
77. The U.S. lags severely behind European countries in the promotion of multilingual edu-
cation. See Christine Wallgren Vance, Preparing a Prosperous Future: Promoting Culture and 
Business Through Bilingual Education, 28 Bilingual Research J. 463, 464; see also Charles 
Kupchan, Speech, The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the 
Twenty-first Century, http://carnegiecouncil.org/viewMedia.php/prmTemplateID/9/prmID/876 
(Feb. 27, 2003) (articulating claim that recent American foreign policy positions characterized by 
isolationism and unilateralism derive in part from an attitude that America is strong enough to do 
as it pleases without having to understand other countries). 
78. Cf supra nn. 4-5 and accompanying text. 
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newspapers, watch American TV and movies, and consume American 
products. 
The five clusters of American characteristics discussed above-ideals, 
political institutions, economy, religion, and the legacy of slavery and race 
discrimination-highlight key features of America's exceptionalism. To as-
sert that the United States needs to be understood differently in these criti-
cal ways, and possesses these important exceptional characteristics, does 
not entail any kind of a priori claims unhinged from rigorous social science 
or empirical evidence. It is not mere triumphalism dressed up in academic 
robes. It is instead a claim that understanding these exceptional American 
traits is a very fruitful way to understand America itself, especially why it 
acts the way it now does in the world. And that is pretty important, not only 
for Americans, but for anyone concerned with how the twenty-first-century 
will develop. 
More than that: American exceptionalism provides a special type of 
inspiration largely absent from secular society. Thomas Friedman recently 
wrote the following about America's distinctive global contribution: 
America's role in the world, from its inception, has been to be the 
country that looks forward, not back. . . . Europeans and others 
often love to make fun of American optimism and naiVete-our 
crazy notion that every problem has a solution, that tomorrow can 
be better than yesterday, that the future can always bury the past. 
But I have always believed that deep down the rest of the world 
envies that American optimism and naIvete, it needs it. It is one 
of the things that help keep the world spinning on its axis. If we 
go dark as a society, if we stop being the world's "dream fac-
tory," we will make the world not only a darker place but also a 
poorer place.79 
America indeed has created a dream for export-it is the Founders' 
original dream, and, as expressed in the Declaration of Independence, it 
became America's exceptional creed: that governments derive their just 
powers from the consent of the governed, and from no other source; that 
governments are instituted in order to secure individual rights of life, lib-
erty, and the pursuit of happiness; and that all persons are created equal, 
thereby entitling them to equal protection of these rights under law. For 
well over two hundred years, this creed has inspired billions of people. It 
stands today as a preeminent political ideal following the decay and col-
lapse of other imperial and totalitarian political claims emanating from Ger-
many, Japan, the Soviet Union, France, and England. Americans believe 
that this creed has universal, timeless appeal. Perhaps that is a self-delu-
sion. Perhaps a radical Islamist or other challenge will eventually overcome 
79. Friedman, supra n. 27, at 450. 
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it. But if it is a delusion, it is a peculiarly enduring American one, and it is 
one worth preserving. 80 
80. See Ignatieff, supra n. 74. As Dean Harold Koh observes, "human rights problems may 
arise as often when the United States does not exercise its exceptional leadership in human rights, 
as when it does. If critics of American exceptionalism too often repeat 'America is the problem, 
American is the problem,' they will overlook the occasions where America is not the problem, it 
is the solution, and if America is not the solution, there will simply be no solution." Koh, supra n. 
20, at 1489. 
